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INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY: AMERICAN
WATCHWORDS FOR EXCELLENCE IN
HEALTH CARE
DR. HARVEY F. WACHSMAN*
The 1994 Republican landslide was evidence of the American
people's insistence on individual responsibility and accountability.
These values apply to the provision of quality health care as well
as government. Simply stated, there can be no quality health care
without accountability.
Much has been made of the Republican Party's Contract With
America.' Tort reform, listed in the Republican Contract, would
eliminate individual responsibility and accountability by immu-
nizing physicians and hospitals from sanctions resulting from
their negligence.2 This immunity from responsibility is something
the medical profession has been trying to achieve for 150 years.3
Part One of this article will discuss the myths surrounding med-
ical malpractice in America. Part Two will discuss how malprac-
tice litigation, or the threat of it, actually helps to prevent mal-
practice and increases the quality of health care in the United
* Dr. Wachsman is a partner at Pegalis & Wachsman, P.C., in New York. Dr. Wachsman
is also currently President and Diplomate of the American Board of Professional Liability
Attorneys as well as Adjunct Professor of Neurological Surgery at the State University of
New York School of Medicine and Adjunct Professor of Law at St. John's University School
of Law. M.D., Chicago Medical School; J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 1976.
1 See 1994 Republican Contract with America. The Republican Party's Contract with
America expresses in writing the goals of the Republican controlled Congress. The Republi-
can party labelled it their "Contract with America."
2 See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE 144 (1993). "[Tlhe bedrock
principle must be that if [the system of] malpractice is to be retained [in light of the pro-
posed tort reforms] as a device for both compensating and preventing medical malpractice
injuries, then any reforms must not hinder access of patients to this system of redress nor
weaken the incentives offered to providers for careful, high quality treatment." Id.
3 See KENNETH A. DEVILLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 25
(1990). The "great deluge" of malpractice suits commencing in the mid-1800s were the "first
symptoms of a professional disease that would plague the medical community for the next
150 years." Id. The explosion of malpractice suits in the 1980s was demonstrative of the
dramatic shift in attitudes towards the medical profession. Id. at 26.
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States and will suggest solutions to the real malpractice crisis fac-
ing this country-bad medicine.
I. MYTHs ABOUT MALPRACTICE
The following are a few statements made by physicians concern-
ing medical malpractice in America:
1. Lawsuits "occur so often that even a respectable surgeon may
well fear the results of his surgical practice."4
2. "Mischievous" lawyers have forced some doctors to allow the
"patients to go unassisted in their afflictions."5
3. "Suits for malpractice were so very frequent" that many phy-
sicians have "abandoned the practice."6
4. Physicians are "constantly liable to vexatious suits, insti-
tuted by ignorant, unprincipled persons, sometimes urged on, it is
presumed, by those who have a private grudge."7
Does this sound familiar? All of these statements were reported
in prominent medical journals in the mid-1800s.8
President George Bush's 1992 crusade against lawyers in "tas-
seled loafers" made lawyer-bashing a key component of his health
care reform plan. Politicians of both parties, the American Medi-
cal Association ("AMA"), the insurance industry, and other tort re-
form advocates joined George Bush in espousing this line that the
medical establishment has been pursuing for more than a
century.9
This misinformation campaign has succeeded in persuading
many policy-makers that the malpractice crisis in America is
nothing more than an invention by greedy lawyers on behalf of
4 Id. at 25 (quoting Alden March, prominent New York physician).
5 Id. (quoting writer for MEDICAL EXAMINER in 1851).
6 Id. (quoting Frank Hamilton, New York physician).
7 Id.
8 DEVEILE, supra note 3, at 25-26. The virtual non-existence of medical malpractice suits
from 1790-1835 led to a feeling of "relative judicial safety" for practicing physicians. Id. at
2. However, almost immediately thereafter patients began suing their physicians at an
unprecedented rate. Id. at 25. As a result, statements such as those enumerated in the text
became quite familiar.
9 WErLER Er AL., supra note 2, at 135 (asserting that "popular and political interest was
sparked when President Bush unveiled his ideas for a 'kinder, gentler' model of malpractice
litigation . . . which rested on anecdotal evidence selected to suit the self-interests and
ideological commitments of the protagonists").
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clients who have no legitimate grievance. 10 The facts show
differently.
Approximately 100,000 Americans die each year, and 500,000
more are injured, as a result of negligence in hospitals.1 These
numbers do not even account for the thousands of additional
deaths that occur because of negligence in doctors' offices and free-
standing clinics.' 2
Despite the AMA's paranoia about lawsuits, fewer than ten per-
cent of the incidents of negligence result in lawsuits.' 3 According
to a study published in the Annals of Internal Medicine, the over-
whelming percentage of judgments and settlements in malprac-
tice cases are justified and are commensurate with the nature of
the patient's injury.1 4 There is no evidence that doctors are being
sued in large numbers without good cause. Studies like the one
mentioned offer much evidence to the contrary.
Part of the problem is that many physicians, like the general
public, do not understand the true nature of medical malprac-
tice. 15 Doctors are not being routinely sued merely because an un-
happy patient does not like an unavoidable result. A physician
cannot be sued because he or she was not as skillful as another
physician might have been.' 6 Nor can he or she be sued because of
a mistake made in good faith after careful examination and
10 See generally HARVEY F. WACHSMAN, LETHAL MEDICINE: THE EPIDEMIC OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE IN AMERICA 54 (1993) (challenging theory of President Bush and many of his
supporters that medical malpractice "crisis" is because of greedy lawyers).
11 Id. at 11-13 (discussing surveys by Harvard University team in 1990 and California
Medical Association in 1977).
12 See generally Daniel Kramer, The Harvard Study, An Analysis, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 9,
1990, at 1 (explaining that study concentrated on medical malpractice in hospital setting
only and had it considered malpractice that occurs in doctors' offices number would be
larger).
13 See Leo Uzych, Malpractice Reform on Lawmakers' Minds: Despite Inflamed Emotion,
Litigation Not Out of Control, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 14, 1995, at 8 (describing
number of lawsuits arising from medical negligence as minute). The Uzych article focused
on a study of 280 patients who suffered from medical negligence of which only eight filed
suit. Id.
14 See Mark I. Taragin et al., Response, The Medical Malpractice System, 118 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 909, 909 (1993) (establishing that, based on countless hours of research,
"exorbitant awards are rare ... [and] jury decisions are typically not arbitrary"); see also
FRANK M. McCLELLAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: LAW TACTICS AND ETHICS 78 (1993) (dis-
cussing recent study which concluded that "[tihe defensibility of [a] case.., predominantly
influences whether any payment is made" and suggested that "unjustified payments are
probably uncommon").
15 WACHsmAN, supra note 10, at 53.
16 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 188
(5th ed. 1984) (noting that negligence is never presumed and that it must be supported and
proven by expert testimony); see also Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 209, 49 N.E. 760,
762 (1898) (establishing that even in 19th Century doctors were held liable in malpractice
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thoughtful diagnosis.17 The law, as interpreted in Pike v.
Honsinger,I makes it clear that a physician must meet certain
standards. In Pike, the court stated that:
[A physician has the] duty to use reasonable care and dili-
gence in the exercise of his skill.... The law holds him liable
for an injury to his patient resulting from want of requisite
skill or knowledge or the omission to exercise reasonable care
or failure to use his best judgment.... The rule of reasonable
care and diligence does not require the use of the highest pos-
sible degree of care.... It is not enough that there has been a
less degree of care than some other medical man might have
shown or less than even he himself might have bestowed, but
there must be a want of ordinary and reasonable care, leading
to a bad result.19
This is the standard against which medical malpractice suits are
measured.2 o
Clearly, the medical malpractice crisis lies not in the number of
lawsuits filed, but in the amount of malpractice committed.21 This
crisis is of epidemic proportions. Malpractice litigation, rather
than being an anathema, could prove to be an aid to the medical
profession by exposing substandard practices and practitioners,
and, as a result, help the profession to maintain the highest possi-
ble standards.
Lawsuits expose negligent doctors and point out areas in which
obvious errors are repeatedly made. Litigation can act as a valua-
ble tool, not only to enforce medical standards, but also in order to
prevent the practice of bad medicine. Unfortunately, the response
of the medical profession and insurance establishments has been
to attack the messenger by blaming the injured patients, their
only when they did not possess requisite skill and learning or did not use appropriate stan-
dard of care).
17 See Pike, 155 N.Y. at 209. The rule requiring physicians to use their best judgment
does not hold them liable for mere error in judgment so long as they do what they think is
best based on a careful examination. Id. at 210.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 12, at 1. In fact, the standard enumerated in Pike is the
same standard that the team for Harvard used in their study which concluded that 100,000
deaths each year are caused by medical malpractice. Id.
21 WACHSMAN, supra note 10, at 55. "The facts show that not only isn't the legal system
being overwhelmed with unwarranted lawsuits, but only a small portion of the malpractice
being committed ... is going to court." Id.
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lawyers, and the legal system rather than the real problem-the
practice of bad medicine.
A. Myth One: Shortage of Obstetricians Due to Threat of
Lawsuits
In 1850, the argument was posited that there would be no sur-
geons left as a result of medical malpractice lawsuits.22 Similarly,
politicians and the AMA argue today that lawsuits are driving ob-
stetricians out of business. 3 It is argued that many obstetricians
are sick of worrying about the threat of unjustified lawsuits, 24 and
that they are tired of paying ever-increasing malpractice insur-
ance premiums. 25 As a result, the argument concludes, these ob-
stetricians stop delivering babies.26
Many communities, particularly rural ones, are desperately un-
derserved The truth is, however, that if obstetricians abandon
their practices and some communities are underserved, it has
nothing to do with lawsuits. Doctors go where wealthier patients
are found.28 Further, they tend to specialize and work in geo-
graphic regions that are the most rewarding.29
AMA reports support this conclusion. An AMA study has noted
that physicians in rural areas earn on average about one-fifth as
22 WAScHMAN, supra note 10, at 162.
23 See, e.g., Donald H. Taylor, Jr. et al., One State's Response to the Malpractice Insur-
ance Crisis: North Carolina's Rural Obstetrical Care Incentive Program, 107 PuB. HEALTH
REP. 523, 523-29 (1992) (arguing that high insurance costs and years of lawsuits have
forced some physicians to either stop practicing obstetrics or reduce number of high risk
patients treated).
24 See John H. Niles, M.D., John H. Niles Doctor Columbia Hospital for Women Senate
Judiciary/ Courts and Administrative Practice Medical Malpractice, May 24, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, Legis. Library, Cngtst. file (stating that "physicians' chance of being sued
for medical liability bears little relation to whether [physicians] have been negligent").
25 Id. (explaining that insurance premiums for obstetricians have gone up approximately
550% in last 15 years).
26 See Joanne Silberner, When to Sue Your Doctor; Minimizing the Headaches of Mal-
practice Medicine, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Dec. 14, 1987, at 66, 68 (reporting on decrease
in obstetricians delivering babies due to malpractice insurance).
27 See generally Dianne Schleuning et al., Addressing Barriers to Prenatal Care: A Case
Study of the Access to Maternity Care Committee in Washington State, 106 PuB. HEALTH
REP. 30, 47-52 (1991). "The loss of obstetrical providers was most apparent in rural commu-
nities." Id. at 47.
28 See Sara Collins, Desperate for Doctors, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Sept. 20, 1993, at
30, 32. "[Dloctors in cities tend to cluster in wealthier areas-where residents are more
likely to have private insurance-and avoid neighborhoods with large numbers of low in-
come people". Id. at 30.
29 Id.
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much as physicians in metropolitan areas.30 It is not surprising
that fewer young obstetricians wish to practice in a rural commu-
nities when the same practice in an urban area or suburb would
generate five times the income.
Nassau County is an affluent suburb of New York City where
obstetricians pay among the highest malpractice insurance rates
in the nation. Yet there are more obstetricians per capita in Nas-
sau than almost anywhere else in the country.31 There is no
shortage of obstetricians, despite the high cost of malpractice in-
surance.3 2 This seems to prove that while there appears to be a
paucity of obstetricians in some rural areas, it is less the result of
lawsuits and more a reflection of a natural tendency on the part of
physicians, as with anyone else, to locate in the regions with the
best quality of life and the most affluent patients.3
As far as the cost of insurance goes, even after the cost of mal-
practice insurance and other business expenses like office rent
and staff salaries, the average obstetrician and gynecologist in
America earns $207,000.1' That compares quite favorably with
the average pre-tax net for all physicians, which, after expenses,
is $164,000. Obviously, insurance premiums are not having an
undo effect on the ability of obstetricians to make a living.
The truth is that some doctors move away from obstetrics be-
cause it is a difficult specialty to practice well. Many doctors get
tired of being called to the hospital at all hours of the night.
Therefore, as they get older, they stop delivering babies. Like-
wise, some young medical students are choosing not to specialize
in obstetrics for the same reasons.
When young doctors begin their obstetrics and gynecologist
practices, most of their patients are young women, many of whom
are pregnant. Therefore, a large portion of the practice is deliver-
ing babies. These patients age with the doctor, changing the na-
ture of the practice. As the patients become middle-aged, the doc-
30 Id. A recruiter for an East Harlem health center in New York has been unable to
recruit obstetricians because salaries are too low. Id.
31 WACHsMAN, supra note 10, at 162.
32 Id.
33 See generally STEVEN E. PEGALIS & HARVEY F. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAw OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE § 8:3 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing obstetrical risk). "The argument that high mal-
practice insurance rates have cut into the availability of appropriate obstetrical services
has been one of those anecdotal myths never borne out by facts or common sense." Id.




tor is required to perform hysterectomies and other types of
surgery, and thus, that becomes a major part of the practice. The
physician can at this point maintain a successful practice without
the sacrifices that necessarily accompany treating pregnant
women.
Often, an older doctor will associate with a younger doctor. The
older doctor then refers any young pregnant patients to his new
associate. The older doctor tells his or her insurance company
that he or she no longer practices obstetrics, and the doctor be-
comes another statistic.
Unfortunately, the myth of the vanishing obstetrician is ac-
cepted as fact, even at the highest levels of government. Such
high powered lobbying groups as the AMA and the American Tort
Reform Association have succeeded, through spending millions of
dollars annually, in misleading the American public and the me-
dia in the belief that obstetrics is a dying specialty.
B. Myth Two: The High Cost of Defensive Medicine
Another myth regarding medical malpractice in the United
States is about so-called "defensive medicine." According to the
AMA, doctors practice "defensive medicine" by conducting costly
and unnecessary tests on patients to protect themselves against
malpractice claims. The AMA asserts that this practice drives up
the overall cost of health care,3 5 amounting to $25 billion of defen-
36Prsdnsive medicine practiced each year. President Bush, in a 1991
speech at Johns Hopkins University, went so far as to claim that
the cost of defensive medicine totalled as much as $75 billion per
year.
3 7
Defensive medicine, as the AMA describes it, does not exist." It
is a contradiction in terms. If tests are being performed to assist a
doctor's diagnosis or treatment, then they are not unnecessary. 9
35 See Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 683 (R.I. 1972) (discussing defensive medicine
as practice of ordering tests just to be availed of any lawsuit).
36 See AMA Applauds House of Representatives for Passing Health Care Liability Re-
form, U.S. Newswire, Mar. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires file. Robert
E. McAfee, M.D., AMA president, stated that "[t]he health care liability system costs this
country nearly $50 billion a year, $25 billion of which is spent on defensive medicine." Id.
37 President George Bush, Speech at Johns Hopkins University (1991).
38 See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, Medical Malpractice Litigation (U.S.)-Medical Mishap
Compensation (N.Z.), 73 CORNELL L. REv. 170, 178 n.26 (1988)(stating that there is no such
thing as defensive medicine but only careful medicine).
39 See generally Reforms Unlikely to Affect Defensive Medicine, OTA says: AMA Criticizes
Report, HEALTH LAw REP., July 28, 1994, at 1048. "Defensive medicine is not always con-
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These tests are part of a thorough and comprehensive medical ex-
amination which benefits the patient. They have nothing to do
with protection against lawsuits.
If doctors perform unnecessary tests, they are more likely to
perform them for the money.40 Cases abound of physicians order-
ing patients to undergo tests and procedures that they do not
need, then billing the patient or the insurance company for the
additional cost. This practice is nothing new.4
If defensive medicine, as defined by the AMA, does exist, it is
not only bad medicine, but a crime. The taking of another person's
money for one's own purposes-whether it is used to purchase un-
necessary tests or to buy a yacht-constitutes embezzlement and
fraud.42 Any doctor charging a fee for a test with no value to the
patient would be taking money for his or her own benefit rather
than for the service that is supposed to be provided to the patient.
That is a crime and offenders should be prosecuted.
Ironically, unnecessary tests or other "defensive medicine" could
not help in the defense against a malpractice claim. If a test is
unnecessary or irrelevant to a patient's treatment, how could it
possibly assist in the defense of a malpractice lawsuit? A malprac-
tice lawsuit seeks to show that substandard care led to the injury
of a patient.4" A physician producing irrelevant test results could
not prove through them that his or her care was therefore stan-
dard. The AMA could perform a valuable service by producing the
names of doctors who they claim are practicing defensive
medicine.
Taking exception to the AMA's view of this situation, there are
those who argue that what has been defined as "defensive
scious behavior, or bad for patients.... [Many] medical procedures are ordered to minimize
the risk of being wrong when the medical consequences of being wrong are severe." Id.
40 See generally Rockefeller, Danforth Urge Reform of Nation's Medical Malpractice Sys-
tem, MED. REP., Aug. 7, 1992 (stating that "physicians are ordering more tests in large part
to increase their incomes, not necessarily to stave off malpractice suits").
41 Id.
42 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 871 cmt. e (1939). "The actor's conduct is
fraudulent if he intentionally causes another to act or refrain from acting by means of
intentionally false or misleading conduct or by his intentional concealment of facts or by his
intentional failure to disclose a fact that he has a duty to reveal to the other." See also State
v. Griffin, 79 S.E.2d 230, 233 (N.C. 1953). "The embezzlement statute makes criminal the
fraudulent conversion of personal property by one occupying some position of trust or some
fiduciary relationship. .. ." Id.
43 See, e.g., Byrd v. State, 637 So. 2d 114, 122 (La. 1994). "To recover for medical mal-
practice, a plaintiff must prove not only that the applicable standard of care was breached,
but also that the doctor's substandard conduct caused an injury." Id.
[Vol. 10:303
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medicine" is actually good medicine.44 A report in the Journal of
the American Medical Association indicates that, at least in terms
of dollars, thirty percent of defensive medicine reflects extra time
spent by doctors with their patients; forty-one percent involves ad-
ditional follow-up visits after a procedure is performed or a course
of treatment is begun; and another twenty percent is spent on ad-
ditional record keeping.45
In reference to the principal causes of medical malpractice-
failing to be present when needed, failing to take a complete medi-
cal history, and failing to perform a thorough physical examina-
tion-it could be that the threat of malpractice lawsuits are actu-
ally forcing doctors to provide better care.46 Although they may
not like spending more time with their patients or keeping more
accurate records, that's what good medicine is all about.
As Dr. Paul Weiler, an author of The Harvard Study, said: "If
we were to find that the tort system was producing more defensive
driving, and we asked the public if they supported such an incen-
tive, my guess is that the vast majority, including most doctors,
would say it was a good thing."4 7 In other words, if defensive
medicine means practicing in a way that reduces unnecessary in-
jury to patients, it is beneficial and should be applauded by the
medical profession.
"Defensive medicine" as defined by the AMA, however, is a diffi-
cult concept to accept. In an industry known for producing scien-
tific data, no one has ever produced a study to support the claim
that defensive medicine exists, let alone that it costs the taxpayers
many billions of dollars a year. Further, no one has produced the
name of a single doctor who has engaged in "defensive medicine"
or a single patient upon whom it has been practiced. In fact, the
only scientific study performed on this was conducted by the Fed-
eral Office of Technology Assessment. This study concluded that
the cost of defensive medicine, to the extent that it does exist, is
44 See Gellhorn, supra note 38, at 178.
45 JAMA (May 22/29, 1989).
46 See, e.g., Robin E. Margolis, Healthtrends, HEALTHSPAN, Sept. 29, 1994. "[D]efensive
medicine motivated by fear of malpractice litigation is not useless, but actually encourages
physicians to be careful ... ."
47 Brian McCormick, Most Doctors Say They Practice Defensive Medicine, American
Medical Association Survey, AM. MED. NEWS, May 25, 1992; see also J.L. Montgomery, Say
No to Inadequate Tort Reform, 95 PosTGRADuATE MEDICINE 37 (supporting Dr. Weiler's
statement).
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negligible and has virtually no impact on the cost of health care in
America.48
C. Myth Three: Malpractice Premiums Increase the Cost of
Medical Treatment
Rather than be hindered by a lack of evidence, propagators of
the "defensive medicine" myth rail against its cost and argue that
malpractice lawsuits add to the country's overall health-care bill
because the threat of lawsuits cause doctors' insurance premiums
to rise.49 Just as this myth is debunked as it relates specifically to
obstetricians, it is equally indefensible as it pertains to the medi-
cal profession as a whole.
Of the $840 billion per year spent in this country on health care,
only $5.6 billion is spent by doctors and hospitals on malpractice
insurance.50 That's less than one percent. Even at this level, in-
surance companies are reaping huge profits on the fees they
collect. 51
The total amount of all malpractice awards in America is less
than the interest insurance companies earn on invested premi-
ums.5 2 Not surprisingly, the fact that billions paid by doctors in
insurance premiums over the years are still in insurance company
coffers became the subject of a study by the United States General
Accounting Office in 1987. 58 Based on the study, it was reported
48 See Margolis, supra note 46, at 29 (suggesting defensive medicine behaviors are not
financial drain on health care system).
49 See, e.g., Robert'G. Miceli, Deprivation of Due Process For Physicians; The "Failure to
Diagnose" Cause of Action, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 859, 940 (1989) (arguing that baseless
lawsuits cause defensive medicine resulting in higher doctor's insurance premiums); see
also Larry S. Stewart, Damage Caps Add to Pain And Suffering, WASH. TIMEs, Nov. 7,
1994, at 18 (asserting that defensive medicine drives up health care costs).
50 See Fran Kritz, Malpractice May Ride the New Reform Wave: With Help From AMA
and Congress, Exorbitantly High Premiums-and Settlements-Could Come Down, MED.
WoRLD NEWS, Apr. 1993, at 70 (noting that doctors pay five to six billion dollars in premi-
ums each year while health care costs overall reached 840 billion in 1992).
51 See Stewart, supra note 49, at 18. "[M]edical malpractice as a line of insurance had
the highest profit as a percentage of premiums in 1991. Losses paid by insurers in 1991 for
medical negligence amounted to only .31% (or 31 cents out of every dollar) of national
health care costs." Id.; see also The Real Malpractice Crisis-It's Not Over Yet, PEoPLE's
MED. Soc'y NEWSL., Aug. 1989, at 6 (reporting that Minnesota's medical malpractice insur-
ers were charging doctors up to three times normal malpractice premiums, even though
malpractice crisis was non-existent).
52 See Mary Rowland, The Liability Crisis Hits Home, WORKING WOMAN, June 1986, at
106 (showing how insurance companies earn so much money on invested premiums that it
exceeds amount actually paid out in malpractice awards).
53 Study, (U.S. GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE) (1987).
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that liability insurance companies had realized profits in excess of
$110 billion during the decade. 54
One New York company, Medical Liability Mutual, started with
no assets in 1975 and accumulated over $3 billion in assets by the
end of 1991.11 This is a prime example of profits far exceeding any
liabilities which one company might incur.
Practically speaking, the annual cost of insurance overall-$5.6
billion-is not substantial enough to have much impact on
America's spiraling health-care costs. Nevertheless, if this is an
area that policy-makers continue to focus on, they should also ex-
amine the profits made by the insurance companies.
According to a 1991 study performed by the Coalition for Con-
sumer Rights ("Coalition"), a Chicago based consumer advocacy
group, all of the costs associated with medical malpractice account
for only one percent of total health-care expenditures in
America.56
The Coalition stated that medical malpractice costs are negligi-
ble in light of such factors as inflation, demographics, and the ad-
vent of newer, more costly treatments in conjunction with limited
competition, fraud, and waste among the medical profession. 7 In
the 1991 report, the Coalition also stated: "To the extent that tort
law forces doctors to exercise a reasonable standard of care, costly
injuries and adverse events are actually limited.... Reducing the
actual amount of doctor negligence should be the cost-contain-
ment strategy for policy-makers concerned about medical mal-
practice."58 In other words, if the medical profession is truly inter-
ested in reducing the cost of health care in America, it should try
to reduce the amount of malpractice that is committed by its
members.
54 Id.
55 WACHSMAN, supra note 10, at 168.
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D. Myth Four: Lawyers Encourage Unfounded Malpractice
Claims
Another pernicious myth is that since most malpractice lawyers
have a contingency fee arrangement with their clients,6 9 in which
the lawyer's fee is based on a percentage of the award granted in
the lawsuit, clients have nothing to lose by suing a doctor. The
system, the argument states, has become a lottery, with unhappy
patients encouraged by greedy lawyers to take a chance that they
will be able to win a large award.
Though there may be some unscrupulous attorneys, realisti-
cally, it does not make sense for a lawyer to encourage a client to
sue unless he or she truly believes the case to be valid. A malprac-
tice lawsuit takes years of work, including legal research, investi-
gation of medical information, and depositions of witnesses. Apart
from the moral and ethical reasons for not bringing a frivolous
lawsuit, a lawyer being paid on a contingency basis, no matter
how much time and energy he or she devotes to a case, will not get
paid if the judge throws it out of court. Therefore, ethics, logic,
and even economics argue against lawyers bringing unwarranted
and frivolous lawsuits.
E. Myth Five: Jury Awards are too High
The AMA and others miss the point when they argue that the
current system of malpractice litigation does not work, that
awards have grown too high, and that the awards do not bear any
relation to the costs associated with the injuries received. The
AMA paints a picture of juries that are misled by sharp lawyers
into granting big judgments to undeserving plaintiffs. Juries are
smarter than that.
For example, juries are outraged when a baby is born brain-
damaged due to a doctor's failure to show up in the labor room and
notice that a fetus was in distress, or when a doctor ignores a wo-
man's breast cancer until it is too late, or when a physician's bla-
tant neglect or incompetence causes the needless death of a pa-
tient.6 ° Juries want to make sure that the plaintiff is properly
59 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Medical Liability Reform; A Conceptual Framework, JAMA,
July 1, 1988, at 70. "The typical medical malpractice plaintiff pays his or her attorney a
percentage of any amount recovered."Id.
60 See, e.g., Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877, 889 (W.Va. 1991)
(jury awarded $3.5 million to parents of brain damaged child regardless of state's $1 mil-
[Vol. 10:303
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compensated for his or her injury. As a result, awards are granted
by juries with the hope that it will provide proper compensation as
well as send a message to doctors that such behavior will not be
tolerated. 1 This is not the act of a duped jury, the jury has a defi-
nite purpose in mind.
Some observers feel juries should not be allowed to consider a
plaintiff's pain and suffering when contemplating the amount to
award the plaintiff.62 Others vehemently disagree and think that
any injury which affects a plaintiff's lifestyle, if caused by negli-
gence, should command a greater compensation.6
II. MALPRATICE CRISIS IS A RESULT OF POOR PRACTICE,
NOT LAWSUITS
Virtually every objective investigation of the medical malprac-
tice crisis in America has shown conclusively that the cause of the
crisis is not lawsuits, but malpractice. A United States Senate
Subcommittee concluded over twenty years ago that "most mal-
practice suits are the direct result of injuries suffered by patients
during medical treatment or surgery. The majority have proved
justifiable."64 Furthermore, a 1992 study reported in the Annals of
Internal Medicine confirms that this is still the case.65
lion cap); see also Monias v. Endal, 623 A.2d 656, 658 (Md. 1993) (affirming jury award of
about $950,000 in damages for doctor's failure to diagnose breast cancer in early stages).
61 See William J. Curran, Law-Medicine Notes: The Malpractice Commission Report,
NEW ENG. J. MED., June 7, 1993, at 1222-23. According to a study conducted for the Rand
Corporation and reported in the New England Journal of Medicine:
Damages awarded in a malpractice suit must be viewed not only as compensating the
victim but also as deterring health-care providers from negligent behavior. The negli-
gence system makes a great deal more sense if it is understood primarily as a means to
deter careless behavior rather than to compensate its victims. By finding fault and
assessing damages against.the negligent provider, the system sends all providers a




But someone whose injury affects his life-style-say the ability to participate in recrea-
tion or the ability to have children-is paying a price that is properly included in a
damages award .... The effect on life-style is enormous and a jury properly assesses
the loss as a real injury that can only be compensated monetarily. In these terms, even
the largest awards do not seem excessive.
Id.
64 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ExEcurIVE REORGANIZATION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE
PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYsIcIAN (Comm. Print 1969).
65 See also Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of
Injury on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALs OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE 780, 780-81 (1992) (noting that 62% of malpractice claims are justifiable and
that doctors' conduct did not conform to standard of care).
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Unfortunately, as a result of the medical and insurance lobby-
ists' efforts, rather than cracking down on incompetent doctors,
there are moves afoot to place the public at an even greater risk
and deny victims the opportunity to seek justice. Rather than
take steps to protect patients and encourage the practice of higher
quality medicine, these groups seek to limit lawsuits against
negligent doctors by enacting various types of tort reform
legislation. 66
The proposed tort reform legislation would, in essence, lock the
public out of the courtroom and limit the recourse available to in-
jured people.67 Tort reform plans come with different names, in-
cluding caps on awards, no-fault, and arbitration.68 Proponents
claim that these plans would benefit the public and provide com-
pensation to a greater number of injured people. 69 Such propo-
nents suggest that cap awards would prevent an overly emotional
jury from imposing an unfairly high judgment, which, as a result,
drives up insurance premiums."0
It is also argued that arbitration would make it easier for pa-
tients to seek compensation because they would no longer need to
hire a lawyer and go through the courts. 71 Furthermore, a no-fault
system would presumably ensure that those who suffer injuries
would be compensated.72 Since individual doctors would no longer
be sued, and a doctor's liability would no longer be an issue, there
would be no cover-ups of negligence and, while no one would be
66 See Alliance Urges Gingrich to Add Malpractice to Tort Reform Bill, PENSIONS & BEN-
EFrrS DAILY (BNA) Jan. 23, 1995, at d12. The Health Care Liability Alliance is comprised of
roughly two dozen health care provider trade associations and malpractice insurers. Id.
67 See Robert L. Lowes, Can Malpractice Really Be Kept Out of Court?, 71 MEDICAL Eco-
NOMICS 106, 120-21 (1994) (noting plaintiffs' attorneys' view that patient's waiver of rights
is unfair because plaintiff does not understand nature of what he's giving up until after he's
injured).
68 Id. at 121 (espousing no-fault in some situations); see also Health System Reform: Is-
sues Related to Health Care Liability: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts and
Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [herein-
after 1994 Hearings] (statement of John B. Niles, M.D., on behalf of the Health Care Liabil-
ity Alliance) (noting approval of caps on awards for non-economic damages and
arbitration).
69 1994 Hearings, supra note 68 (noting that discussed model ensures full and fair
compensation).
70 Id. (discussing effect judgments have on insurance premiums).
71 See Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dis.
pute Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 777, 783 (1994) (noting potential
benefits of alternative dispute resolution to aggrieved patients).
72 See Dennis J. Rasor, Note, Mandatory Medical Screening Panels: A Need to Re-Evalu-
ate, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 115, 134 (1993) (noting purposes of no-fault system).
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able to get the large awards presently available, everyone would
receive some level of compensation.73
The fact is, however, that these tort reform measures have four
things in common: insurance companies save money; incompetent
doctors avoid blame and any meaningful form of discipline; pa-
tients and their families, who have been destroyed in the process,
are prevented from obtaining financial compensation, the only
kind of justice available to them, and the general public is left un-
protected from doctors who may maim and kill their patients.74
Various tort reform measures have made their way through the
legislatures of a number of states. For instance, California has
put limits on the amount of money plaintiffs can receive for non-
economic damages, i.e. pain and suffering. 75 Similarly, New York
breaks from custom and allows awards of more than $250,000 to
be paid out to the plaintiff over a number of years, rather than the
usual one lump-sum.76
Perhaps the most damaging tort reform assault has come from
Washington D.C., where Congress is considering legislation that
would ultimately force states to institute major changes in the
way medical malpractice cases are resolved. 7 Several proposals
have been advanced, including: placing caps on non-economic
damages; 78 limiting joint and several liability;79 and allowing the
payment of large awards in installments. 0
73 Id. (noting benefit to physician-patient relationship); see also Julie Cohen, Tort Re-
form Unlikely in Health Bill, THE RECORDER (Amer. Lawyer Media L.P.), Aug. 25, 1994, at
6 (noting reform opponent's argument that medical malpractice crisis is caused by number
of injured patients, not number of suits).
74 It is unfortunate that tort reform advocates make the argument that lawsuits have
caused a malpractice crisis when that in fact is simply untrue. See Cohen, supra note 73.
75 See CAL. Crv. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1994) (limiting recovery against health care
provider to $250,000 for non-economic loss).
76 See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5031(e) (McKinney Supp. 1994) (noting future payments of
damages shall be paid in periodic installments).
77 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 352, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (discussing uniform national
standards for resolution of medical malpractice claims); H.R. REP. No. 229, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995) (citing imposition of certain requirements on medical malpractice liability);
S. REP. No. 11, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (providing grants to states that promote devel-
opment of alternative dispute resolution).
78 See H.R. REP. No. 352, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(a) (noting cap of $250,000 on non-
economic damages); H.R. REP. No. 229, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (noting $250,000 cap
for non-economic medical malpractice losses); S. REP. No. 11, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 202(b) (noting cap applies regardless of number of defendants).
79 See H.R. REP. No. 352, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(c) (noting that liability shall be
several only, not joint); S. REP. No. 11, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (stating all losses shall
be allocated proportionate to fault).
80 See H.R. REP. No. 352, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105(a) (permitting payments for future
losses to be paid periodically); H.R. REP. No. 229, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (noting
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Such proposals may spur the development of alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR"), arbitration, no-fault and other methods of
resolving claims out of court.8 ' As the foregoing will illustrate,
each of these proposals is flawed.
As a means of resolving disputes, ADR often means a no-fault
system similar to workers' compensation. Under such a system,
everyone who is injured by a doctor would receive compensation
without going to court.82 Yet, there would be no findings of liabil-
ity or guilt against doctors.83 Perhaps most unfortunate is that
even though long and costly court proceedings would be elimi-
nated, injured patients generally would receive fairly small
awards.8 4
The Commonwealth of Virginia, for example, instituted a no-
fault system in 1988 to deal solely with cases of brain damaged
children.85 Not surprisingly, during the first five years of this pro-
gram, from January 1, 1988 to January 1, 1993, not one single
award was made to a brain damaged child or to the parents. 86
Then, in early 1993, the Virginia Attorney General's office re-
ported that they had made three awards, for a paltry total of
$65,000, less than $22,000 for each brain damaged child.87 It ap-
pears that this no-fault system has saved the insurance compa-
nies and doctors an unbelievable amount of money while severely
and negatively impacting powerless victims.
The benefits of a relatively effective no-fault system are solely
theoretical. Since there would be no finding of fault, doctors would
have to be sufficiently insured for injuries that are not necessarily
the result of negligence as well as those that are. Thus, a far
greater number of claims would have to be paid, which would
surely be reflected in insurance premiums. No-fault would also
liability for payments to be made periodically if award exceeds $50,000); S. REP. No. 11,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(a) (noting any person required to pay more than $100,000 does
not have to pay in lump sum payment).
81 See H.R. REP. No. 352, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201-03 (outlining plans for alternative
dispute resolution); S. REP. 11, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (outlining standards for alter-
native dispute resolution grant).
82 See Rasor, supra note 72, at 134 (discussing how there would be no need to go to
court).
83 Id. (noting that quality control network would likely suffer).
84 Id. (stating that plaintiffs in medical malpractice claims sacrifice their ability to re-
ceive full compensation).
85 See VA. CODE A'N. § 38.2-5002-B (Michie 1994) (establishing statutory relief exclusive
of all other rights).
86 Information obtained by author directly from Virginia Attorney General's Office.
87 Id.
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fail to serve the intended purpose of entirely eliminating lawsuits.
There will always be disputes, just as there are under workers'
compensation and under the no-fault systems of automobile insur-
ance.s8 In fact, the combined cost of litigation and of payments to
patients who were injured, but not as a result of negligence, could
conceivably more than offset the overall savings that a no-fault
system might otherwise achieve.8 9
In addition, by eliminating the standard of fault, any deterrent
effect that malpractice lawsuits now have on incompetent doctors
also would be eliminated.9 0 "Replacing the present tort system
with a no-fault insurance scheme would not necessarily be
cheaper, [and] might well abolish the deterrent signal of distorted
clinical decision making."91
Other ADR mechanisms frequently discussed involve either
substituting or supplementing juries with panels of "experts," who
presumably are better able to understand the complicated facts of
a malpractice case than lay people.92 Such panels might be part of
the arbitration process and take the place of a trial by jury.9 3
Alternatively, they may be screening panels that rule on the
merits of cases before trial.94 The theory behind such panels is
that juries lack the ability to form intelligent opinions on such
complicated matters, and thus make emotional decisions resulting
in unreasonably high awards to plaintiffs. Proponents of tort re-
form claim that juries, which are perfectly capable of ruling on
whether to send a murderer to the electric chair, are not compe-
tent to rule fairly and impartially when a physician is accused of
malpractice. Moreover, eliminating trials by jury singles out the
medical profession for protection against lawsuits, a protection
that is not afforded to any other profession in this country.
A variation of the panel system is one in which, even if the panel
decides against the plaintiff, he or she may still proceed with the
88 See WACHSMAN, supra note 10, at 76-77.
89 See Gellhorn, supra note 38, at 193-94 n.26 (stating that costs of comprehensive no-
fault system would be staggering).
90 See WACHSMAN, supra note 10, at 177.
91 William B. Schwartz & Neil K Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrance-An Eco-
nomic View of Medical Malpractice, NEW ENG. J. MED., June 8, 1978, at 1282.
92 See Rasor, supra note 72, at 139 (illustrating features of state screening panels in
Appendix chart A).
93 Id. at 136-37.
94 Id. at 116. "Some screening panels are similar to arbitration because they result in
formal decisions by a third party as to the legal rights and responsibilities of the parties."
Id.
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lawsuit.95 The rationale behind this system is that, under these
circumstances, the panel does not deny victims their right to a
trial by jury. Rather, it simply deters plaintiffs from pursuing
frivolous lawsuits.96 In effect, however, this stage adds to the cost
and time of the process, and thus deters meritorious lawsuits as
well as frivolous ones. 97
Some panel proposals suggest that if the panel rules against the
plaintiff and he or she proceeds to trial anyway, the plaintiff
would have to pay the doctor's legal bills if the lawsuit fails.98
Such a system adds insult to injury. Since a losing action would
result in double legal fees, many plaintiffs without substantial fi-
nancial resources would be deterred from even initiating the ac-
tion. There are never any guarantees of victory in court. As a
result, many people, particularly the poor, who are already in-
jured and in debt as a result of their medical bills, would be de-
terred from pursuing legal action for fear of losing, and possibly
being held liable for their adversary's attorneys' fees.
Another tort reform proposal would place limits on the amount
of money a patient could receive for non-economic damages such
as pain and suffering, emotional distress, disfigurement, and loss
of companionship. 99 Proponents of these types of caps argue that
when someone has been injured or killed as a result of such medi-
cal incompetence, the compensation that the individual or family
receives should reflect only the economic loss that has been suf-
95 See Lowes, supra note 67, at 106 (discussing problems with non-binding alternative
dispute resolution).
96 See Rasor, supra note 72, at 124-26 (discussing constitutional issues arising from
screening panel requirements).
97 Id. at 127-30 (discussing additional burdens screening panels put upon plaintiffs).
98 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 352, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106(a) (1995); see also Jean A.
Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model Legislation to Cure
Judicial Ills, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 181, 194 (1990) (noting several states' statutes requir-
ing sanctions for plaintiffs who ignored unfavorable panel decisions and were unsuccessful
at trial). Several of these statutes do not look kindly upon plaintiffs who proceed after an
unfavorable panel decision. Id.; MAss. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 60B, para. 6 (Supp. 1989) (requir-
ing plaintiff to post $6,000 bond before proceeding to trial after unfavorable panel decision);
MICH. Comp. LAws ANN § 600.4915(2) (West Supp. 1988) (requiring $5,000 bond to proceed
to trial if panel finds claim to be frivolous); NEv REV. STAT. § 41A.056(2) (Supp. 1989) (im-
posing sanctions against plaintiffs who proceed to trial after unfavorable panel decisions
and lose).
99 See, e.g., Kevin S. Mahoney, Note, Alaska's Cap on Non-economic Damages: Unfair,
Unwise and Unconstitutional, 11 ALAsKA L. REV. 67, 86-87 (1994) (discussing Alaska stat-
ute [§ 9.17.010] which places $500,000 cap on any act of negligence including medical mal-
practice). Contra Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 836 (N.H. 1980) (striking down statute
limiting medical malpractice non-economic damages to $250,000).
For a list of all states addressing caps on medical malpractice recoveries, see FRANK M.
MCCLELLAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 85-86 (1994).
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fered. 100 They believe that the injured party should be compen-
sated for such things as medical bills and lost wages, but should
not become eligible for a windfall at the expense of the doctor and
the insurance company.1 01
Indiana laws include both caps on awards and panels to screen
cases before they go to trial.'0 2 Physicians' groups said that Indi-
ana law was a model for national reform when it was passed in
1975.103 But, according to the Indianapolis Star, "the act has
turned out to benefit the two groups who lobbied hardest for its
passage-doctors and their insurance companies-far more than
it benefits malpractice victims and their families." 10 4
Indiana caps awards of any kind at $750,000,105 an amount that
does not begin to compensate victims for the costs that can be in-
curred as a result of medical malpractice. A young child, for ex-
ample, severely injured or brain damaged at birth, may incur mil-
lions of dollars of expenses during his or her life. Verdicts that
may seem large by today's standard may turn out to be inade-
quate decades into the future, especially because inflation consist-
ently reduces the value of the dollar, while at the same time, med-
ical costs continue to increase. To illustrate, fifty years ago a
$50,000 award for a brain-damaged child might have seemed like
a lot of money, but it would hardly be sufficient today to meet the
needs of that same victim.
Who really ends up paying when awards are capped? Few med-
ical malpractice victims can afford to pay medical expenses on
their own. If the legal system has not provided adequate means,
or if caps on awards prevent injured plaintiffs from receiving what
they deserve, it is the government that ends up paying the differ-
ence, usually in the form of programs like Medicaid, Medicare and
100 See, e.g., JEFFREY O'CoNNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No FAULT INSURANCE FOR
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 112-15 (1975) (advocating no-fault liability for solely economic
damages).
101 Id.
102 IND. CODE ANN. § 27-12-14-3 (Burns 1993) (capping awards); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-12-
10-1 (Burns 1993) (screening panels).
103 See generally Frank Cornelius, Crushed by My Own Reform, N.Y. TMEs, Oct. 7, 1994,
at A3 (urging repeal of Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act). The author, who lobbied the
Indiana Legislature in favor of the Act, noted that, at the time, the Act "was acclaimed as a
pioneering reform of the medical malpractice laws .... " Id. The author later became a
victim of the stringent cap of $500,000 imposed by the Act. Id.
104 See Joseph T. Halliman & Susan M. Headden, Malpractice Laws Stacked Against
Victims: Doctors, Insurance Companies Reap Biggest Benefits, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 26,
1990, at 1.
105 IND. CODE ANN. § 27-12-14-3 (Burns 1993).
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the various services for the disabled.10 6 This system is unfair be-
cause the taxpayers ultimately pay the bill while the guilty physi-
cian and his or her insurance company get off-the-hook by paying
only a fraction of the true cost of negligence.
The panel system has not proven to be a great success in Indi-
ana either. The panels, which render non-binding opinions on
cases before they go to trial, were supposed to speed up the pro-
cess. However, with a backlog of 1,200 cases, it takes almost three
years to get a panel decision. Injured plaintiffs must wait three
years before the trial process even begins. 10 7
Critics of the Indiana law also point out that, while the legisla-
tive objectives were to attract more doctors to the state and to re-
duce the cost of health care, neither has been accomplished. Indi-
ana still has the tenth-lowest number of doctors per capita of any
state in the country,'08 and the cost of a hospital stay is still
higher than many other states that have not enacted this type of
tort reform. 10 9
Another proposal that has been bandied about aims to either
limit or eliminate joint and several liability. :10 For example, con-
sider the case of an obstetrician who fails to arrive to examine his
or her patient when the patient goes into labor. If and when fetal
distress occurs, the child will suffer brain-damage. In such a case,
several parties might share liability: the obstetrician, for not
showing up; the hospital, for failing to act in the doctor's absence
when fetal distress occurred; and probably other physicians as
well, such as the hospital resident and the anesthesiologist, who
were all present and did not provide the care necessary to save the
baby from injury.
106 See generally McCLELLAN, supra note 99, at 65-66 (discussing and describing nature
of Medicare and Medicaid programs).
107 See, e.g., Anita J. Slonski, How Long Can Indiana Remain a Malpractice Paradise?,
MED. ECON., Feb. 4, 1991, at 122. "The only thing the panels do is slow the whole process
down." Id.
108 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNrrEs STATES 1994 122 (1993). The rate of physicians per 100,000 residents in Indiana is
165, while the national average is 224. Id.
109 Id. at 111. The cost of hospital care in Indiana, as of 1991, was approximately $6
billion. Id.
110 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1579, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5104 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 3222,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5104 (1993) [hereinafter Managed Competition Act of 1993]. In ad-
dition to abolishing joint and several liability, the Bills, sponsored by Sen. John Breaux (D.
La.) and Rep. Jim Cooper (D. Tenn.), would also require alternative dispute resolution
prior to trial, a cap of $250,000 on non-economic damages, and periodic payments of future
damages, among other provisions. Id. at §§ 5102, 5201, 5104-05.
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Moreover, if it turns out that the obstetrician has no malprac-
tice insurance, or, in the alternative, only a small policy that
would be insufficient to compensate the victim, under joint and
several liability, the other doctors and the hospital would each be
held individually liable for paying to the victim whatever amount
the jury awarded. That is the best method for ensuring that in-
jured plaintiffs receive the awards that they are entitled to. After
all, if an obstetrician's negligence includes the failure to maintain
an adequate insurance policy, the victim should not be forced to
suffer twice, once because of malpractice and again from failure to
collect the judgment.
Tort reformers say that defendants in medical malpractice law-
suits should be responsible for paying damages only in direct pro-
portion to the degree of their culpability. 1 ' Thus, if the jury finds
the obstetrician sixty percent at fault, the hospital thirty percent
at fault, and the resident and anesthesiologist each five percent at
fault, tort reformers believe that each should be responsible for
paying only their respective proportionate percentage of the total
award. However, under this callous approach, if the obstetrician
has no insurance, the plaintiff loses sixty percent of the award,
while the insurance companies remain protected. Even more un-
fortunate is the fact that the child's family is left to figure out how
best to pay for a lifetime of medical bills.
Another popular tort reform proposal would allow the doctors
who have been found guilty of negligence and their insurance com-
panies to pay out large awards over a period of time." 2 The logic
of this proposal is that a large part of the award in a medical mal-
practice case is to cover the cost of future expenses." 3 Since these
expenses occur over time, tort reformers argue against requiring
payment in one lump sum immediately after the judgment is
rendered.
The reasons for payment in one lump sum are several fold.
First, is the issue of fairness. A victim of medical malpractice
111 See John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several Liability of Multiple Tortfeasors be
Abolished?, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 193, 197 (1986) (criticizing advocates for abolition of
joint and several liability).
112 See, e.g., Managed Competition Act of 1993, supra note 110, at § 5105; see also Mc-
CLELLAN, supra note 99, at 86.
113 See, e.g., American Bank Trust v. Community Hospital of Los Gatos-Saratoga, 683
P.2d 670, 676 (Ca. 1984) (noting legislature's rational basis for determining that future
damages should be paid periodically).
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should have control over the full amount of the award, to spend as
he or she deems fit. For example, a disabled person may want to
spend a large amount of money immediately to purchase a spe-
cially designed home to accommodate their handicap; the family of
an injured child might want to travel to another city to consult
with other physicians; and another family might want to invest
the money and use it later for the child's education. After going
through the trauma of medical negligence and years of litigation,
the plaintiff should be entitled to that freedom. Moreover, he or
she should not have to go back each time there is an unusual ex-
penditure to ask permission from the doctor or the insurance com-
pany to obtain additional funds.
In addition, if the defendant can hold on to that money and pay
it out in installments, then the defendant will be able to invest it
and keep the earnings on the money that rightly belongs to the
plaintiff. If payment is made in a lump sum, the malpractice vic-
tim can invest the money and, as a result, increase the value of
the award. As we have seen, insurance companies are already
making tremendous profits because of the installment payment
policy.114 They simply should not be allowed profit at the expense
of people who are adjudicated as victims of medical malpractice.
It seems clear, not only from logical assumptions based on our
own experience, but on information taken from states where tort
reform legislation has been enacted, that these "reforms" do noth-
ing to benefit the American public. Despite such evidence, how-
ever, the campaign for tort reform continues.
III. CONCLUSION
An honest analysis of all of the evidence clearly indicates that
the American people need reforms that protect the public, not re-
forms that blame the injured, the disabled, and the victims of
medical ineptitude and neglect. The reforms advanced by tort re-
form proponents, purportedly in the public interest, are actually
in the interests of the thousands of physicians who will be allowed
to practice bad medicine, undetected, undeterred, and untroubled
by their conscience or the courts.
114 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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